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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The dramatic increase in the use of derivative financial instruments, derivative 
commodity instruments, and other similar financial instruments (hereafter referred to as 
derivatives) and losses resulting therefrom during the 1990s created a need for their 
disclosure. According to the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, the notional 
(contract) amounts of derivatives increased from $7.1 trillion in 1989 to $118 trillion in 
2001. Significant losses were also reported by several entities during this same period. 
These losses caught investors and the public by surprise because these derivatives had not 
been previously reported in the financial statements. These large losses, the general 
public outcry, and recommendations from several interest groups prompted the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) to take action. 
In January 1997 the SEC, in its position as the "watch dog" for investors, issued 
Financial Reporting Release No. 48, Disclosure of Accounting Policies for Derivative 
Financial Instruments and Derivative Commodity Instruments and Disclosure of 
Quantitative and Qualitative Information about Market Risk in Derivative Financial 
Instruments, Other Financial Instruments and Derivative Commodity Instruments 
(hereafter referred to as FRR No. 48), requiring companies to disclose market risk1 
inherent in these financial instruments. 
FRR No. 48 allows firms to choose from three alternative disclosure formats: 
tabular presentation, value at risk or sensitivity analysis. Of the three alternatives, the 
1 Market risk is defined in FRR No. 48 as "the risk ofloss arising from adverse changes in market rates and 
prices, such as interest rates, foreign currency exchange rates, commodity prices, and other relevant 
market rate or price changes ( e.g., equity prices)." 
tabular format is the most disaggregated (Wong, 1999; Linsmeier and Pearson, 1997). 
The disclosure involved in the value at risk format and sensitivity analysis format results 
in a summary figure. According to the SEC, these three disclosure formats were 
provided for flexibility in accommodating the different types of firms with varying 
degrees of market risk and alternative ways of measuring market risk. 
A large body of financial accounting research on disclosure has provided 
evidence supporting the proposition that disaggregated information is more value relevant 
than aggregated information (Sorter, 1969; Feltham, 1977; ljiri, 1995). Based on this 
proposition, this study investigates the relative information content of the SEC derivative 
disclosure requirements. Specifically, this study examines the value relevance of 
aggregated (sensitivity analysis format or value at risk format) versus disaggregated 
(tabular format) disclosure of derivative information under FRR No. 48. 
Since the derivative disclosures are provided as supplementary information to the 
financial statements collectively, they co11;ld be seen as providing incremental 
information. However, given that the alternative formats involve varying levels of 
aggregation, the disclosure formats required by the SEC provide an opportunity for 
comparing the relative information content of the alternative disclosure formats. The 
difference between incremental and relative information content is set forth in Biddle et 
al. (1995). Studies regarding incremental information content examine whether one 
accounting measure provides information content beyond what is provided by another 
accounting measure, and it relates to situations in which one accounting measure is given 
and assessment is desired regarding the incremental contribution of another measure. 
Relative information content applies to situations in which multiple, mutuallr exclusive 
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choices are available and comparison of the magnitude of the information content of the 
various disclosure formats is desired. 
1.1 Purpose of the Study 
This study examines whether the tabular format ( as defined by FRR No. 48) has 
greater relative information content than either the value at risk format or the sensitivity 
analysis format. Thus, the research question to be examined is: 
Does derivatives disclosure reported using the disaggregated 
alternative (the tabular format) have greater relative information 
content than disclosure reported using the aggregated disclosure 
alternatives ( either the value at risk format or the sensitivity analysis 
format)? 
The findings of this study are important for several reasons. First, prior research 
has provided evidence to support the notion that information asymmetry can result in 
adverse economic consequences; hence, management would wantto choose the more 
informative accounting method. The findings of this study will provide evidence to 
determine which derivatives disclosure method reduces information asymmetry. Second, 
the evidence from this study will provide justification for such regulatory bodies as the 
SEC and Financial Accounting Standards Board (F ASB) for issuing regulations that 
provide either aggregated or disaggregated disclosures. The findings will also aid the 
SEC in determining whether the disclosure methods provided by the SEC improve users' 
understanding of derivatives since one of the complaints set forth by interest groups was 
the lack of the public understanding of derivatives. Fourth, the findings will aid 
practitioners in determining which derivatives disclosure method has more relative 
information content. 
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The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides 
background information on derivatives. Chapter 3 presents the literature review and 
hypothesis development. The methodology is presented in Chapter 4 and research design 
is discussed in Chapter 5. The empirical results are provided in Chapter 6. The 
conclusions are presented in Chapter 7. 
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CHAPTER2 
BACKGROUND 
2.1 Derivatives 
A derivative is a financial instrument whose value depends on another financial 
instrument of security (stock, stock index, foreign currency, commodity, bond, etc). 
There are several types of derivatives and they include: forward contracts, futures 
contracts, options, and swaps. Complex instruments are created from a combination of 
these four types of derivatives. Depending on whom you talked to, derivatives can be 
seen as useful or destructive tools. Warren Buffet referred to them as "financial weapons 
of mass destruction" and Alan Greenspan was quick to respond that "The benefits of 
derivatives, in my judgment, have far exceeded their costs" (The Daily Oklahoman, May 
9, 2003). Mr. Greenspan said that derivatives have enabled-financial market participants 
to lessen the severity of the 2001 recession. Derivatives are used for .risk management, 
speculation, trading efficiency (market liquidity), and for market completeness.2 · 
A forward contract is an agreement between two parties to buy and sell an asset at 
a certain time. in the future and for a certain price. The contract has a zero value at the 
time of the agreement and there is no cost to enter the contract. Forward contracts are not 
traded on an exchange; hence, they are not standardized. Forward contracts can be 
customized to suit the needs of both parties. A futures contract is similar to a forward 
contract, but it is standardized and the underlying assets are financial instruments and 
commodities. Options give the holder a right to buy or sell the underlying asset. There 
2 Market completeness is one in which all identifiable payoffs can be obtained by trading the securities 
available in the market. 
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are two types of options: call and put. A call option gives the holder the right to purchase 
the underlying asset and a put option gives the holder the right to sell the underlying 
asset. An option is standardized. There is a cost to enter into an option contract unlike a 
forward or futures contract. A swap is the exchange of cash flows between two parties. 
A swap is not standardized and it is usually an exchange of interest rates between two 
parties. Exhibit 1 illu~trates examples of the four types of derivatives. 
Exhibit 1 - Illustration of Derivatives* 
Forward Contract 
"JKL Co sells MNO Co. a forward interest rate agreement at an interest rate of 10% that will 
apply to a $100,000 principal. The time period is one year with quarterly settlement dates. The 
reference rate is based upon the specific index, e.g., the LIBOR rate. At the first settlement date, 
the LIBOR rate is greater than 10%. Therefore JKL will have to pay MNO a value equal to the 
present value of the difference between the cash flows of the LIBOR rate and the 10% rate". 
Futures Contract 
"On April 5, 1995 PQR Co. contracts to buy 200 ounces of gold at $400 per ounce for September 
1995 delivery. The total contract price is $80,000. If on April 6 gold is trading at $405 per 
ounce, PQR has effectively made $1,000 (200 x [405-400]). But if the price had dropped to $390 
per ounce, PQR would have lost $2,000 (200 x [400-390])". 
Swaps 
"STU Co. agrees to make payments to VWX Co. at a fixed interest rate of 8% for the next two 
years. VWX agrees to make payments to STU at a variable rate of interest equal to a specific 
index + 1 %. If the index rate goes up, VWX will make payments to STU. But if the index rate 
goes down, STU will make payments to VWX". 
Option Contract 
ABC Co. common stock is currently trading at $12 a share. An option contract that costs $10 is 
available to buy 100 shares of the stock at $14 a share. The option contract expires in three 
months. If the stock fails to exceed $14 a share, the holder will not exercise the option. But if the 
price a rises above the option price, e.g., $16 a share, the holder would choose to exercise the 
option and make a profit of $190 (100 x [14-14] - 10)". 
* Williams and Eaton (1995) 
The CPA Journal; Oct 1995 
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2.2 FASB Response 
The F ASB piecemeal approach to solving accounting problems is evident in the 
development of standards concerning derivatives disclosure. The evolution of 
developing accounting standards for derivatives disclosure began with Financial 
Accounting Standard (FAS)# 105, Disclosure of Information about Financial 
Instruments with Off-Balance Sheet Risk and Financial Instruments with Concentration 
of Credit Risk, was issued in March 1990. Disclosure requirements of this standard 
included the face amount or contract (notional) amount, the nature and terms of the 
instruments, the loss due to nonperformance of either party or parties, the cash 
requirements, type of collateral, and any significant concentration of credit risk. FAS 
#105 also requires a discussion of the credit and market risk of the instruments. There is 
no requirement for fair value disclosure of the instruments and it applies only to financial 
instruments with off-balance sheet risk of accounting loss and concentration of credit 
risk. The standard excluded several financial instruments that qualify as derivatives ( e.g., 
commodity derivatives, foreign currency type derivatives, etc.). The disclosure 
requirements were mostly qualitative. 
FAS #107, Disclosure about Fair Value of Financial Instruments, was issued in 
December 1991. This standard requires fair value disclosure of financial instruments for 
both assets and liabilities recognized and not recognized on the balance sheet for which it 
is practicable to estimate fair value. FAS # 107 provides guidance on how to measure the 
fair value of derivatives. Quoted market prices are to be used to measure the fair value of 
derivatives, if quoted market prices are not available, then quoted market prices of 
financial instruments with similar characteristics should be used. If those prices are not 
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available, a disclosure should be made on how the fair value was determined. This 
standard also excluded several derivatives and again the disclosure requirements were 
mostly qualitative. 
The next standard issued regarding derivatives was FAS #119, Disclosure about 
Derivative Financial Instruments and Fair Value of Financial Instruments, and it 
amended #105 because only instruments that were not subject to FAS #105 were covered. 
FAS # 119 requires a distinction between derivatives held for trading and those held for 
purposes other than trading. A distinction is also required for derivatives held for 
hedging and those for speculation. The standard requires the description of the 
anticipated transaction that is hedged, the classes of derivatives used to hedge, the 
amount of gains and losses resulting from hedging. FAS # 119 requires the 
disaggregation of information such as classes of losses, business activities, or other 
categories that are consistent with how the instruments are-managed. FAS # 119 
encourages quantitative market risk information, but does not require it. 
The above three standards collectively were still considered inadequate in 
providing information to creditors, regulators, shareholders, and other users regarding 
derivatives, ~herefore, the F ASB went back to the drawing board to come up with a more 
comprehensive standard. FAS #133, Accountingfor Derivative Instruments and Hedging 
Activities, issued June 1998, requires all derivatives to be recognized as either assets or 
liabilities on the balance sheet and they should be measured at fair value. This standard 
supersedes FAS #s 105, and 119 and amends # 107. If certain conditions are met, 
derivatives may be classified as: (a) fair value hedges, (b) cash flow hedges, and (c) 
foreign currency hedges. Gains and losses from fair value hedges are recognized in the 
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period of change together with offsetting gains or losses attributable to the risk being 
hedged. The effective portion of derivative gains and losses from cash flow hedges are 
initially reported as a component of comprehensive income and later transferred to 
earnings when the forecasted transaction affects earnings. The ineffective portion of 
derivative gains and losses are reported in earnings immediately. The derivative gain or 
loss is effective if the correlation ratio for the derivative and the hedged instrument is 
between 80% and 125%. Because of the complexity of this standard, the FASB set up a 
special committee, the Derivatives Implementation Group (DIG), to assist the F ASB in 
resolving issues regarding the implementation of FAS 133. Difficulties encountered by 
practitioners in implementing FAS #133 caused the effective date to be postponed from 
June 15, 1999 to June 15, 2000. The standard was also amended by FAS #s 138 issued 
June 2000 and 149 in April 2003. This standard also requires the disclosure of risk 
inherent in the use of derivatives. The FASB hopes that the implementation of FAS #133 
will provide adequate information about derivatives to the preparers and users of 
financial statements. Finally the F ASB requires the disclosure of market risks inherent in 
derivatives. 
2.3 SEC Response 
The rapid growth in derivatives usage and the lack of disclosure by firms in their 
financial reporting is of concern to accounting regulatory bodies. Derivatives use 
increased from $7 .1 trillion in 1989 to $118 trillion in 2001 and derivatives losses tripled 
to $6 billion from 1993 to 1994 (Williams and Eaton, 1995). The Basle Committee on 
Banking reports that unregulated derivatives increased dramatically also during the same 
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period. See Figure 1 for a graphical depiction of contract (notional) amounts. The SEC 
observed that market risks associated with these financial instruments were not being 
clearly disclosed, and in some cases not disclosed at all, in the financial statements. 
Consequently, users were surprised when several large companies like Proctor & 
Gamble, Gibson Greeting Cards, Dell Computer, Metallgesellschaft, Barings PLC, and 
Sumitomo reported heavy losses from dealing in derivatives (Johnson and Swieringa, 
1996). See Exhibit 2 for a list of some of the companies and losses incurred. Figure 1 
presents a graphical display of the total notional amounts of outstanding derivatives for 
five periods. 
Exhibit 2 - Derivatives Losses in the 1990s 
Company/Entity Amount of Loss 
Air Products $ 113,000,000 
Askin Securities 600,000,000 
Baring Brothers 1,240,500,000 
Cargill (Minnetonka Fund) 100,000,000 
Codelco Chile 200,000,000 
Glaxo Holdings PLC 150,000,000 
Long Term Capital Management 4,000,000,000 
Metallgesellschaft 1,340,000,000 
Orange County 2,000,000,000 
Proctor & Gamble 157,000,000 
Source: Derivatives: Valuable Tool or Wild Beast? By Brian Kettel 
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Area of Loss 
Leverage and Currency Swaps 
Mortgage-backed Securities 
Options 
Mortgage derivatives 
Copper & precious metals, futures & forwards 
Mortgage derivatives 
Currency and interest rate derivatives 
Energy derivatives 
Reverse repurchase agreements and 
Leveraged structured notes. 
Leverage German Marks and US Dollars 
After the issuance of FAS #119, the SEC realized that the standard did not 
provide adequate information for users. This Standard requires only qualitative 
disclosures such as, the policies, nature, terms, and cash requirements of derivative 
financial instruments. The definition of derivative financial instruments in this standard 
does not include derivative commodity instruments and other financial instruments with 
similar market risk as does FRR No. 48. SFAS No.119 encourages, but does not require, 
quantitative disclosures about the market risk exposures inherent in market-risk sensitive 
instruments. 
Figure 1 - Total Notional Amounts of Outstanding Derivatives 
(in billions of US dollars) 
$120.00 
$100.00 
$80.00 
$60.00 
$40.00 
$20.00 
1989 1995 
Data Source: Basie Banking Committee 
! G series 1 j 
1999 2000 2001 
The SEC reviewed about 500 financial statements of registrants during 1994 and 
1995 and noted that the 1995 derivative disclosures were more informative than the 1994 
disclosures. The SEC attributed this improvement in the 1995 derivative disclosures, in 
part, to the guidance of SF AS No.119 issued in October 1994. However, the SEC 
decided that SF AS No.119 did not go far enough. Consequently, FFR No. 48 was issued 
in January 1997. FFR No. 48 requires quantitative disclosures providing users with 
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information regarding derivative financial instruments and other similar financial 
instruments. These financial instruments are to be classified into trading and other-than-
trading portfolios and certain information related to the portfolios is to be disclosed using 
one of the three alternative formats: the tabular format, the sensitivity analysis format, or 
the value at risk format. The disclosure is to be categorized into the following market 
risks: interest rate risk, foreign currency exchange rate risk, commodity price risk, and 
any other significant market risk. A registrant can use a different disclosure format for 
each market risk exposure category. The disclosures are to be made outside of the 
financial statements and the notes to the financial statements. 
The three alternative disclosure formats allowed by the SEC provide flexibility in 
accommodating different types of firms with varying degrees of market risk and 
alternative ways of measuring market risk. While the SEC is aware that the use of these 
three formats might affect comparability, they believe that the·effect will be minimal if 
firms provide the description of the model being used, the assumptions, and parameters. 
The tabular disclosure format requires companies to ( 1) present fair value 
information and contract terms of derivatives necessary in determining future cash flows 
for each of the next five years and (2) an aggregated total for all years after the fifth year. 
This information is to be presented for each market-risk exposure category along with the 
maturity dates for the trading and other-than-trading portfolios. The derivatives and other 
similar financial instruments are to be grouped based on their common characteristics. 
Within price risk and foreign currency risk categories, instruments are disaggregated by 
the type of commodity and by functional currency. An example of the tabular disclosure. 
format is provided in Exhibit 3. Some respondents to the SEC requirements expressed 
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concern that the tabular format is so detailed and disaggregated that competitors, 
suppliers, and market traders could potentially use the information to exploit the 
registrants' positions in the market. The SEC addressed this concern by recommending 
the use of either the sensitivity analysis format or value at risk format, either of which 
results in a summary figure and does not disclose detailed information. 
Exhibit 3 - Illustration of the Tabular Disclosure Format 
Interest Rate Sensitivity 
The table below provides information about the Company's derivative financial instruments and other financial 
instruments that are sensitive to changes in interest rates, including interest rate swaps and debt obligations. For 
debt obligations, the table presents principal cash flows and related weighted average interest rates by expected 
maturity dates. Weighted average variable rates are based on implied forward rates in the yield curve at the 
reporting date. For interest rate swaps, the table presents notional amounts and weighted average interest rates 
by expected (contractual) maturity dates. Notional amounts are used to calculate the contractual payments to be 
exchanged under the contract. The information is presented in U.S. dollar equivalents, which is the Company's 
reporting currency. The instrument's actual cash flows are denominated in both U.S. ($US) and German 
deutschmarks (DMs), as indicated in parentheses. 
December 31, 19xl 
ExQected Maturin:: Date--------------------
There- Fair 
19x2 I9x3 I9x4 I9x5 I9x6 After Total Value 
(In millions) 
Liabilities 
Long-term Debt Fixed Rate ($US) $XXX $XXX $XXX $XXX $XXX $XXX $XXX $XXX 
Avg. Interest Rate X.X% X.X% X.X% X.X% X.X% X.X% X.X% 
Fixed Rate (DMs) XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX 
Avg. Interest Rate X.X% X.X% )(.Xo/o X.X% X.X% X.X% X.X% 
Variable Rate ($US) XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX 
Avg. Interest Rate X.X% X.X% X.X% X.X% X.X% X.X% X.X% 
ExQected Maturin:: Date-------------------
There- Fair 
I9x2 I9x3 I9x4 I9x5 I9x6 After Total Value 
(In millions 
Interest Rate Derivatives 
Interest Rate Swaps 
Variable to Fixed ($US) $XXX $XXX $XXX $XXX $XXX $XXX $XXX $XXX 
Avg. pay rate X.X% X.X% X.X% X.X% X.X% X.X% X.X% 
Avg. receive rate X.X% X.X% X.X% X.X% X.X% X.X% X.X% 
Fixed to Variable ($US) XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX 
Avg. pay rate X.X% X.X% X.X% X.X% X.X% X.X% X.X% 
Avg. receive rate X.X% X.X% X.X% X.X% X.X% X.X% X.X% 
*Partial Sample of Tabular Disclosures from the SEC ( 1997) 
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The sensitivity analysis format computes the hypothetical gain or loss in future 
earnings, fair value or cash flows of the derivative financial instruments over a selected 
period based on hypothetical adverse changes in market rates and prices. A brief 
discussion of the assumptions underlying the calculations is also to be presented. Unlike 
the tabular format, where disaggregated information is presented for each market-risk 
exposure category, the sensitivity analysis format reports aggregate gains or losses across 
categories. Results of the sensitivity analysis for the foreign currency category and the 
commodity price category may be one single number for each category. An example of 
the sensitivity analysis format is presented in Exhibit 4. 
Exhibit 4 - Illustration of the Sensitivity Analysis Format 
Example of the Sensitivity Analysis format (Time Warner exposure to the 
risk of changes in interest rates and foreign exchange rates)* 
... based on Time Warner's variable-rate debt and related interest rate swap 
contracts outstanding at March 31, 1996, each 25 basis point increase or 
decrease in the level of interest rates would respectively increase or decrease 
Time Warner's annual interest expense and related cash payments by 
approximately $16 million, including $7 million related to interest rate swap 
contracts. Such potential increases or decreases are based on certain 
simplifying assumptions, including a constant level of variable-rate debt and 
related interest rate swap contracts during the period and, for all maturities, and 
immediate, across-the-board increase or decrease in the level of interest rates 
with no other subsequent changes for the remainder. 
Based on the foreign exchange contracts outstanding March 31, 1996, each 5% 
devaluation of the U.S. dollar as compared to the level of foreign exchange 
rates for currencies under contract at March 31, 1996 would result in 
approximately $28 million of unrealized losses and $11 million of unrealized 
gains on foreign exchange contracts involving foreign currency sales and 
purchases, respectively. Conversely, a 5% appreciation of the U.S. dollar 
would result in $28 million of unrealized gains and $11 million of unrealized 
losses, respectively. 
*Linsmeier and Pearson ( 1997) 
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The value at risk format presents the potential changes in fair values, earnings, or 
cash flows of derivative financial instruments for each market-risk exposure category and 
the probability of occurrence over a selected period of time. Basically, this alternative 
presents a summary statistical measure of the probability of a loss exceeding a particular 
level ofloss over a percentage of the holding period. The minimum loss that would be 
incurred over a certain percentage of the time is also provided. Like the sensitivity 
analysis format, the value at risk format also aggregates risk probabilities across different 
interest rates, exchange rates, or commodity prices. An illustration of the value at risk 
format is provided in Exhibit 5. 
Exhibit 5 - Illustration of the Value at Risk Format 
Summary example of the Value at Risk format* 
Suppose at the reporting date, a distribution of possible one-day changes in the 
value of a forward foreign exchange contract is as follows: 
The probability the loss will exceed $130,000 is 2% 
The probability the loss is between $110,000 and $130,000 is 1 % 
The probability the loss is between $90,000 and $110,00 is 2%, and so on. 
Then there is a 5% probability that the loss will exceed $90,000 (summing the 
probabilities). If 5% probability is used as a cutoff to determine the loss from 
normal and abnormal market movements, then $90,000 is the value at risk. 
* Linsmeier and Pearson (1997) 
FRR No. 48 implies that one format can be restated into another format if the 
model and assumptions are known. For example, the tabular format can be restated to the 
sensitivity analysis format or value at risk format if the assumptions used in preparing 
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tabular format are known and vice versa. This implication is drawn from the following 
statement found in FRR No. 48: 
"When a registrant changes quantitative disclosure methods from one year to the 
next, providing two alternatives, rather than one, for disclosing comparative, year-
to-year information, the registrant can reduce cost by employing either one of the 
following methods. First, a registrant may restate prior year's disclosures based 
on the new alternative that has been selected for the current year. Second, instead 
of recreating prior records and information in order to prepare restated 
information, the registrant may report the prior year's disclosure as originally 
presented and, in addition, to disclosing the current year's information in 
accordance with the new method, disclose the current year's information under 
the method used in the prior year" (p. 74-75 emphasis added). 
The spirit of this statement is echoed by Linsmeier and Pearson (1997): 
"Although the tabular disclosures do not directly slate the likely impact of 
changes in market rates and/or prices on fair values, earnings or cash flows, the 
information provided about contract terms and cash flows (when combined with 
other information about possible movements in market rates and prices) will 
allow readers of the disclosures to prepare 'back of the envelope' sensitivity 
analysis or value at risk estimates" (p. 111 ). 
These two statements support the notion that this issue is one of aggregated versus 
disaggregated type disclosures where the tabular format represents disaggregated and the 
sensitivity analysis format or value at risk foi:mat represents aggregated information. 
The tabular format does not provide a direct measure of the possible changes in 
market rates and prices and the effect on fair values, earnings or cash flows. The main 
difference between the sensitivity analysis format and the value at risk format is in the 
treatment of potential loss and market movements. The sensitivity analysis format 
discloses the potential losses arising from hypothetical market movements with differing 
likelihoods of occurrences across instruments and no adjustments are made to correlate 
potential loss to market movements. The value at risk format discloses potential loss 
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arising from equally likely market movements across instruments and adjusts the 
potential loss to reflect the correlations between market movements (FRR No. 48; p. 26). 
FRR No. 48 disclosure requirements became effective for all market registrants 
with market capitalizations on January 28, 1997 in excess of $2.5 billion is June 15, 1997 
and for registrants with market capitalizations of $2.5 billion or less, the effective date 
was June 15, 1998. 
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CHAPTER3 
RELATED LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
3.1 Disclosure 
Research examining the effect of accounting disclosures suggests that disclosures 
should provide useful information to users and potential users of financial statements to 
aid in decision making (F ASB, 1990). Disclosures should provide clarification for 
existing items in financial statements either by providing new information or additional 
information about an item (Goldberg et al., 1995). Research indicates that higher levels 
of disclosure provide more information. In this same vein, studies investigating 
aggregated disclosures versus disaggregated disclosures provide evidence that 
disaggregated disclosures have greater relative information than aggregated disclosures. 
Historically, accounting standards focused on recognition, however recently there 
has been a shift toward focusing on disclosure. According to the F ASB, there are four 
major purposes of disclosure: (1) to describe the recognized items and to provide relevant 
measures of those items other than the measure in the financial statements; (2) to describe 
unrecognized items and to provide a useful measure of those items; (3) to provide 
information to help investors and creditors assess risks and potential of both recognized 
and unrecognized items; and (4) to provide important information in the interim while 
other accounting issues are being studied more in depth. Johnson (1992) calls for 
research to validate the distinction between recognition and definition. Barth et al. 
(1994) responded to this call by providing accounting researchers with a framework for 
18 
categorizing, summarizing and analyzing disclosure requirements to be used when 
investigating disclosure issues more broadly. 
According to Lev (1992), disclosure, especially voluntary disclosure, enhances a 
firm's value. There is information asymmetry between a firm's management and outside 
interested parties. The role of disclosure is to decrease this asymmetry. Disclosure, or 
the absence thereof, affects outsiders' perceptions of a firm's economic condition and 
future prospects. Outsiders' perceptions affect key variables such as cost of capital, and 
input prices (Lev, 1992). Lev (1992) posits that a negative perception of a firm due to 
incomplete information (information asymmetry) leads to the undervaluation of a firm's 
securities and high yields ( cost of capital) for new stock and bond issues. 
3.1.1 Disclosure and Capital Market Factors 
Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) examine the effect-s of reducing information 
asymmetry between management and outside interested parties. They demonstrate that, 
under certain conditions (i.e., limited risk bearing capacity of risk-averse market makers 
and the interaction of private information), corporate disclosures that reduce information 
asymmetry, ipiprove future liquidity, and hence, reduce cost of capital. The reduction 
appears to be larger for larger firms. These findings are consistent with Lev (1992). 
Lang and Lundholm (1993) examine the determinants of analysts' ranking of 
firms'disclosure practices and the effects on firm's performance, security issuance, and 
the correlation between earnings and returns. They find that expanded disclosures are 
associated with higher stock returns, larger firms and firms issuing securities. This study 
also appears to confirm that there is a negative relationship between earnings/returns 
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correlation and disclosure score. The disclosure score metric captured the level of 
information asymmetry. 
It has also been documented that firms with higher disclosure levels have a larger 
analyst following, more accurate analyst forecasts, less dispersion among individual 
forecasts, and less volatility in forecast revisions (Lang and Lundholm, 1996). They used 
analysts' evaluations ?f firms' disclosure practices (found in the Report of the Financial 
Analysts Federation Corporate Information Committee) as a comprehensive measure of 
disclosure in examining the effects on certain capital market factors. Their study also 
provides indirect evidence that greater levels of disclosure affect factors that have been 
shown theoretically to reduce firms' cost of capital. 
Healy and Palepu (1993) illustrate the dilemma management faces in 
communicating private information to outsiders. They illustrate that firms' disclosure 
strategies geared towards reducing information asymmetry affect share prices and reduce 
the cost of capital. 
Healy et al. (1999) examine the benefits of expanded voluntary disclosures as 
measured by analysts' evaluations documented in the annual Report of the Association of 
Investment Management and Research Corporate Information Committee (AIMR 
Reports). They report that when there is an increase in disclosure, stock performance 
also increases. Further, there are increases in institutional ownership, analyst following, 
liquidity, and a decrease in investor uncertainty. These findings are similar to Lang and 
Lundholm (1993) 
Dhaliwal et al. (1979), Diamond and Verrecchia (1991), Greenstein and Sarni 
(1994), Welker (1995), Bartov and Bodnar (1996), Botosan (1997) Sengupta (1998) and 
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Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) find that increased disclosure is associated with lower cost of 
capital - debt or equity. Bartov and Bodnar (1996) determine that greater information 
asymmetry among market participants leads to higher transaction costs and lower 
liquidity, which in tum increase the expected rate ofretum and lower securities prices. 
Empirical research examining disclosure and cost of capital: cost of equity capital 
(Botosan, 1997), cost of debt capital (Sengupta, 1998) suggests that there is an 
association between disclosure levels and cost of capital. 
In summary, extant research in firms' disclosure provides evidence to support the 
proposition that disclosure, whether voluntary or mandatory, benefits a firm economically 
in several ways when it reduces information asymmetry. Reduction in information 
asymmetry reduces cost of capital, increases stock prices ( enhances firm value), reduces 
analysts' forecast dispersions, and among others, affects the future economic prospects of 
a firm in a favorable manner. 
3.2 Relevant Studies Examining Aggregated versus Disaggregated Information 
Research examining the information content of aggregated versus disaggregated 
information appears to support the notion that the disaggregation of financial disclosures 
provides greater relative information content than aggregated financial disclosures. 
Sorter (1969) proposes that presenting financial information in a disaggregated format 
provides more information to the user than in an aggregated format because it allows the 
user to weight the various components as he/she sees fit. Sorter (1969) prescribes the 
events theory which states that the purpose of accounting is to provide information about 
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relevant economic events which allows the user to develop his own input values for his 
own decision models. He further suggests that information is lost through aggregation. 
Ijiri (1995), in an empirical analysis, extends Sorter (1969) using segment 
reporting. Ijiri (1995) compares the informativeness of disaggregated segment reporting 
versus aggregated segment reporting and concludes that disaggregated data is more 
informative than aggregated data if users apply the appropriate weights to coefficients in 
the decision models. 
Orcutt et aL ( 1968) investigate the information loss incurred when data are 
aggregated. In this study, a microanalytic model was developed simulating the U.S. 
economy and different levels of aggregated national data were entered into the model to 
determine the information loss at each aggregation level. They measured information 
loss as the inability of the model to estimate the appropriate coefficients of the different 
economic indicators such as disposable income, government expenditures, and net 
financial assets. Results indicate a deterioration in the ability of the model to estimate 
these economic parameters as the level of aggregation increases. 
The ability of decision makers to use aggregated versus disaggregated information 
was investig~ted by Barefield (1972). He compares the decision-making abilities of 
subjects using disaggregated data versus subjects using aggregated data. Barefield (1972) 
concludes that subjects using disaggregated data performed better than subjects using 
aggregated data. The subjects with disaggregated data identify the best decision criterion 
with a greater degree of consistency than their counterparts. 
Feltham (1977) compares the expected payoff and predictions of decisions based 
on aggregated versus disaggregated cost information. He developed a general analytical 
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model for evaluating the payoff consequences and predictions of alternative information 
systems. He then uses the model to determine the information loss due to cost 
aggregation. Feltham ( 1977) concludes that the expected payoff from decisions based on 
aggregated information is lower than the expected payoff from decisions based on 
disaggregated information, ignoring information and analysis costs. 
3.3 Summary and Hypothesis 
Based on accounting research examining disclosure levels and the information 
content of disaggregated (versus aggregated) information, I expect the value relevance of 
FRR No. 48 financial instrument disclosures will be greater for firms using the tabular 
disclosure format relative to firms using either the sensitivity analysis format or the value 
at risk format. Hence, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
Hl: There is no difference in the relative information content between 
disclosures providing disaggregated derivative data (in the tabular 
format) and disclosures providing aggregated data (i.e., sensitivity 
analysis format or value at risk format). 
The alternative hypothesis is: 
HlA: Disclosures providing disaggregated derivative information (in the 
tabular format) have greater relative information content than 
disclosures providing aggregated data (i.e., sensitivity analysis format 
or value at risk format). 
The information content of the derivatives disclosure ofboth groups of firms will 
be evaluated to determine which disclosure method is more informative. The null 
hypothesis assumes that there will be no significant difference in the information content 
of derivatives disclosure of firms using the tabular format and firms using either the 
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sensitivity analysis or the value at risk format after the derivatives disclosure methods are 
revealed. 
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CHAPTER4 
METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Utilizing Bid-Ask Spread to Examine Information Asymmetry 
A number of accounting research studies have used bid-ask spreads to measure 
the effects of information asymmetry on several factors including liquidity (Tinic, 1972; 
Tinic and West, 1972; Stoll, 1978; Amihud and Mendelson, 1986 and 1989; Lee et al., 
1993; and Welker, 1995), stock returns (Amihud and Mendelson, 1989;·Stoll, 1989), 
stock prices (Demsetz, 1968; Copeland and Galai, 1983; and Glosten and Milgrom, 
1985), market depths (Copeland and Galai, 1983; Lee et al., 1993), dividends (Venkatesh 
and Chiang, 1986; Howe and Lin, 1992), and cost of capital (Amihud and Mendelson, 
1986; Dhaliwal et al., 1979; Greenstein and Sarni, 1994; Bartov and Bodnar, 1996; and 
Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000). 
Bid-ask spread is the difference between a dealer's quoted selling price (the 
"ask") and the buying price (the "bid") of the same shares of a stock at a point in time 
(Callahan et al., 1997; Stoll, 1978, 89). The bid-ask spread is the cost ofimmediacy 
provided by a dealer. The dealer provides liquidity in the market by being ready to 
transact with traders at anytime (Demsetz, 1968). The dealer offers a lower bid price and 
requests a higher ask price to traders who demand an immediate exchange transaction 
and are willing to buy at a price higher than the equilibrium ("true"/ price and sell lower 
than the "true" price. The difference between the two prices, the bid-ask spread, covers 
3 Equilibrium price is defined by Demsetz (1968) and Barnea and Logue (1975) "as the average of the bid 
and ask prices". Stoll defines the ''true" price as the "the price that would, in the dealer's opinion, exist in 
the absence of transactions costs." The "true" price is the price that would exist if there were no demand 
for immediacy and all participants were equally informed, Copeland and Galai (1983). 
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the dealer's cost and provides a profit. The bid-ask spread is the price of the dealer 
product, that is, a charge for providing the immediate exchange of titles to securities 
(Benston and Hagerman, 1974). 
Research examining the dealer cost component of bid-ask spreads prescribes that 
the bid-ask spread is actually composed of three types of costs: inventory holding costs, 
order processing costs, and adverse selection costs. The dealer has to have the 
appropriate level of inventory to meet immediate trade demands of traders, and as such, 
he incurs inventory holding costs. The order costs are incurred by a dealer in arranging 
trades and serving as a temporal clearinghouse for unequal trades; Unequal trades occur 
when equal and opposite trades are not executed simultaneously (Demsetz, 1968; Stoll, 
1978; Bagehot, 1971; Copeland and Galai, 1983). The cost that is of importance to 
accounting research is the adverse selection cost component because it reflects 
information asymmetry. Adverse selection costs are incurred by the dealer and result 
from transacting with "informed traders" (Bagehot, 1971; Copeland and Galai, 1983). 
Adverse selection occurs when two unequally informed persons trade. The more 
informed party will take advantage of the other's ignorance to trade at a gain. The 
uninformed party will either demand a higher price to cover his loss or he will demand 
product warranty for protection against the probability of purchasing a bad product. 
Akerlof (1970) in his seminal paper introduces the adverse selection problem in terms of 
the used car market. He posits that used cars sellers are better informed of their product 
quality than buyers. Used car dealers with bad quality cars ("lemons") will have the 
incentive to sell their cars since the average price will be attributable to the entire grouP., 
both good and bad used car dealers, and not to individual sellers. Buyers will only be 
26 
willing to pay a price that reflects the average quality of cars on the market which would 
be below the fair market value of good quality cars but above the fair market value of 
poor quality cars. Owners of good quality cars would not be willing to accept the 
average price and as such, bad cars will drive out good cars, and in extreme cases, shut 
down the market. The adverse outcome is the probability that bad cars ("lemons") will 
be sold at the average price. 
Analogous to the securities market, informed traders possess nonpublic 
information. This enables them to formulate an estimate of the future value of a security 
that is superior to the estimate of either the dealer or the _liquidity-motivated traders. The 
dealer and liquidity-motivated traders have the same information about a security; 
however, they are less informed than "informed traders". Since the informed traders will 
only trade when it is in their best interest, the dealer will never gain from them. The 
dealer makes up this loss by trading with liquidity-motivated traders who are willing to 
pay a fee for immediacy. The liquidity-motivated traders are only interested in exchange 
transactions - exchanging securities for money or money for securities. The dealer 
chooses a bid-ask spread that will maximize his profits (Copeland and Galai, 1983). If 
the spread is too wide, he loses expected revenues from liquidity-motivated traders, but 
his potential losses to informed traders is reduced. If the spread is too narrow, his 
expected losses to informed traders increases, but the expected revenues from liquidity-
motivated traders increase. 
The adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread represents information 
risk, the probability that the next trader whom the dealer interacts with will be an 
informed trader (Copeland and Galai, 1983). The greater the risk oflosing_to informed 
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traders, the larger the spread (Callahan et al., 1997). Hence, the adverse selection 
component reflects the degree of information asymmetry risk perceived by the dealer 
from his transaction with informed traders. 
4.1.1 Relevant Studies Using Bid-Ask Spreads 
There is a growing body of research using bid-ask spreads to measure the effect of 
disclosure levels on several capital market factors. Copeland and Galai (1983) develop a 
model to illustrate the effect of information asymmetry on the bid-ask spread. They find 
that if the dealer perceives a greater probability of transacting with an informed trader he 
will widen the spread. The dealer expected costs depend on the probability that he will 
be trading with an informed trader. This represents information asymmetry between the 
dealer and the informed trader. Their results, consistent with prior studies, indicate a 
negative relationship between the bid-ask spread and volume, competition, and risk, and 
a positive relationship with price and stock variance. 
Analytical models estimating components of the bid-ask spread indicate that there 
is a positive relationship between the adverse selection component and information 
asymmetry. Glosten and Harris (1985) develop a model showing that there will be a bid-
ask spread even if all other costs (inventory holding, order processing, etc.) are all zero. 
The bid-ask spread can be a "purely informational phenomenon." Glosten and Harris 
(1988) develop a two-component (transitory and adverse selection) asymmetric 
information model. They illustrate that permanent price change is related to the adverse 
selection component (information asymmetry) while temporary price change corresponds 
to the transitory component (inventory holding and order processing costs). The 
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conclusion reached is that the bid-ask spread is determined to some extent by information 
asymmetry. 
Venkatesh and Chiang ( 1986) examine the effect of earnings announcements and 
dividend payments on information asymmetry as measured by the bid-ask spread. The 
study investigates the proposition that there is greater information asymmetry prior to 
firm-specific events that have the potential for revealing important information and the 
predictability of date of occurrence. The study examines three groups of announcements: 
(1) joint earnings and dividend announcements on the same day, (2) initial (first) 
announcement, either earnings or dividend announcements that were not preceded by 
another announcement in the prior thirty days, and (3) second announcements which 
follow the first by at least ten days but no more than thirty days. The results reveal that 
bid-ask spreads were larger before second announcements and smaller before first and 
joint announcements. The results provide support for the proposition that dealers suspect 
non-routine announcements whenever the second announcement is delayed from the first 
by at least ten days and dealers react by widening bid-ask spreads. 
Howe and Lin (1992) investigate the effect of dividends on information 
asymmetry as measured by the bid-ask spread. The results suggest that on average, firms 
that pay no dividends have wider bid-ask spreads than firms that do pay dividends. The 
results also show that the bid-ask spread declines as the dividend yield increases. 
Lee et al. (1993) use the bid-ask spread and depth to measure the effect of 
information asymmetry around earnings announcements. Depth is the number of shares 
available at each price - the bid and ask price. Lee et al. posit a relationship between bid-
ask spread and depth: wide spreads are accompanied by low depths, and narrow bid-ask 
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spreads by high depths. Lee et al. ( 1993) indicate that prior studies use only the bid-ask 
spread in making inferences about market liquidity, however, both the bid-ask spread and 
the depth are needed to make inferences about market liquidity since market liquidity has 
both a price dimension (the spread) and a quantity dimension (the depth). The study 
provides evidence to support the conclusion that dealers protect themselves immediately 
after earnings announcements because dealers believe that they could be trading with 
informed investors or investors with expertise in analyzing earnings data. 
Greenstein and Sarni (1994) investigate the effect of accounting disclosure on the 
relative bid-ask spread by examining the effect of the SEG's segment disclosure 
requirements. Greenstein and Sarni (1994) observe that the relative bid-ask spread 
decreased significantly for firms reporting segment disclosure for the first time in 1970 
while firms reporting segment disclosure prior to 1970 did not exhibit a decrease in bid-
ask spread. 
Krinsky and Lee (1996) investigat~ the behavior of the three components of the 
quoted bid-ask spread surrounding earnings announcements. Their results suggest an 
increase in information asymmetry among market participants during the event period. 
This is perhaps because the dealer assumes that there are information processors who 
have superior ability in assessing firms' performance from the announcements. The 
results also show a decrease in both inventory and holding costs for the event and 
predisclosure periods suggesting that the risk of holding excessive inventory is decreased 
because of increased trading activity as supported by prior research. 
Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) use bid-ask spread to test for information asymmetry. 
They also include trading volume and share price volatility as proxies for th~ information 
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asymmetry component of cost of capital. They compare two groups of German firms -
one group electing International Accounting Standards (IAS) or U.S. GAAP and the other 
group using German GAAP. Results indicate that firms electing IAS or U.S. GAAP had 
lower bid-ask spread and higher trading volume than firms electing German GAAP, but 
there were no significant results for share price volatility among firms. Coller and Yohn 
(1997) investigate wh~ther the decision to issue management forecasts is related to 
information asymmetry and whether the forecasts reduce information asymmetry. Coller 
and Yohn (1997) predict that if management forecasts reduce information asymmetry 
then firms issuing management forecasts will have smaller bid-ask spreads than firms that 
do not issue management forecasts. The forecasts provide information that is held by a 
subset of investors, and therefore reduce information asymmetry. Results are consistent 
with prior studies. Firms issuing management forecasts have smaller bid-ask spreads 
than firms that do not issue management forecasts and thus management issues forecasts 
in order to reduce information asymmetry. 
Based on the extant accounting research employing the bid-ask spread to measure 
the effect of information asymmetry on several factors, it will be used to measure the 
difference in information asymmetry between firms using the tabular format and firms 
using either the sensitivity analysis or the value at risk format. 
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4.2 Measuring the Information Effect 
4.2.1 Variable Description 
The variables, except for SPREAD, are defined similarly as in Coller and Yohn 
(1997). The variable SPREAD for each of the five days of the Pre-SEC period is 
calculated as the absolute difference of bid-ask spreads of the current day and the 
previous day divided by the average of the bid-ask spreads of the Pre-SEC five days. For 
example, the SPREAD of day one is calculated as the absolute difference of day one and 
day two bid-ask spreads divided by the average bid-ask spreads of day one through day 
five. The SPREAD for day two is calculated as the absolute difference of day two and 
day three divided by the average bid-ask spreads of day one through day five. The 
SPREAD for day three is calculated as the absolute difference of day three and day four 
bid-ask spreads divided by the average bid-ask spreads of day one through day five. The 
SPREAD for day four is computed similarly as prior days. SPREAD for the Day of the 
SEC filing period is calculated as the absolute difference of day six and day five bid-ask 
spreads divided by the day five bid-ask spread. 
SPREAD for each of the five days after the SEC filing date, the Post-SEC period, 
is calculated as the absolute difference of the current day and the previous day bid-ask 
spreads divided by the average bid-ask spreads of day six through day ten. For example, 
the SPREAD for day six is calculated as the absolute difference of the day six and day 
seven bid-ask spreads divided by average bid-ask spreads of day six through day ten. 
SPREAD for days seven, eight, and nine are calculated the same way as day six. These 
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computations would result in nine SPREAD data for each firm. The formulas below 
describe the computations for the three periods: 
Pre-SEC SPREADS (Day 1 through Day 4) 
Day 1 SPREAD = SPREAD1 - SPREAD1-1 
Avg(SPREAD1+ ...... SPREAD1s) (1) 
SPREADS for Day 2 through Day 4 are computed as in (1) 
Day of SEC filing 
Day 5 SPREAD = SPREAD16 - SPREAD1s 
Avg(SPREAD1+ ...... SPREAD1s) (2) 
Post-SEC (Day 7 through Day 10) 
Day 1 SPREAD = SPREAD1 - SPREAD1-1 
Avg(SPREAD1 + ...... SPREADt11) (3) 
SPREADS for Day 7 through Day 10 are computed as in (3), 
Where t starts at day seven. 
The bid-ask spread is the difference between the ask and the bid prices. Prior 
research has.shown that inventory holding costs and order processing costs affect the bid-
ask spread, thus to measure the information asymmetry portion of the bid-ask spread, 
variables representing these costs have to be included. Prior research (Demsetz, 1968; 
Tinic, 1972; Stoll, 1978; and Coller and Yohn, 1997) finds a negative relationship 
between bid-ask spread and trading activity. TRANS is the control variable in the model 
for trading activity; it measures the number of transactions in a firm's stock each day. 
The order processing costs are the costs the dealer incurs in processing orders for firms' 
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stock. Variability of returns has been shown by prior research (Bamea and Logue, 1975; 
Stoll, 1978) to affect inventory holding cost. The dealer has to keep inventory to meet 
investors' buy and sell demands. The longer inventory is held on hand, the less liquid the 
firm's stock is and as such, the difference between buy and sell prices will increase as 
time goes on. VAR is the variable measuring the variance of a stock returns each day. 
Price has also been sho.wn by prior research (Demsetz, 1968; Tinic, 1972; Tinic and 
West, 1972; and Coller and Yohn, 1997) to affect bid-ask spreads. PRICE, the average 
of all individual buy and sell transactions prices is included in the model as the control 
variable for price. Prior research has shown that price is positively related to spreads. 
The more orders are made for a firm's stock the narrower the spread. Quoted depth, 
DEP, is also included in the model because Lee etal (1993) concludes that a complete 
quote should include the number of shares in all quotes. DEP is number of shares 
available at the ask price plus the number of share available at bid price during each day. 
FORMAT is the indicator variable; it is set to one for tabular format firms, zero 
otherwise. FORMAT is used to capture the difference in bid-ask spread between the 
tabular format firms and the sensitivity analysis format and value at risk format firms. 
Since FORMAT takes on the value of zero for the sensitivity analysis format firms and 
value at risk format firms, the value of the coefficient on FORMAT is the excess over or 
below zero which is attributed to the tabular format firms. Similarly to previous research, 
the natural logarithm of variables except for the FORMAT variable is used in the 
regressions. 
With the above defined variables, the regression model was estimated as shown 
below: 
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The regression analysis was conducted on the three period samples to test whether the 
tabular format firms experienced a significant difference in bid-ask spreads than the 
sensitivity analysis or value at risk format firms. The expected signs for the variables are 
as follows: DEP (-),PRICE(+), VAR(+), TRANS(-), and FORMAT(-,+). 
4.2.2 The Information Effect 
Prior research utilizing the bid-ask spread to measure the effect of disclosure 
levels on capital market factors documented in this study show that these specific 
disclosures serve as positive signals to the market. Venkatesh and Chiang (1986), Howe 
and Lin (1992), Greenstein and Sarni (1994), Krinsky and Lee (1996), Coller and Yohn 
(1997) and Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) examine the effects of issuing dividends, 
segment disclosure, management forecasts, and firms using more transparent accounting 
methods. These studies show that in comparison to nondisclosure firms, these firms 
experienced smaller bid-ask spreads. These disclosures send positive signals of better 
financial conditions for these firms, and the market reacted favorably through smaller 
bid-ask spreads. In this study, it is expected that the disaggregated derivatives disclosure, . 
the tabular format would result in a significant percentage change in bid-ask spreads for 
firms using the tabular format than for firms using either the sensitivity analysis format or 
the value at risk format. The tabular format could produce favorable or unfavorable bid-
ask spreads since this format is expected to have greater relative information content. 
The difference will be reflected in the magnitudes of the bid-ask spreads of both groups 
of firms. 
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It is anticipated that on the Day of the SEC filing the percentage change ofbid-
ask spreads for tabular format firms would be larger, but there would be no change in 
bid-ask spreads for either group of firms during the Pre-SEC period. This result is 
expected because the derivatives disclosure method will be known after the SEC filing 
date. The Post-SEC period results will confirm whether the reaction observed during the 
Day of SEC filing period is sustained during the five days after the annual report is filed. 
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CHAPTERS 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
5.1 Sample Design and Data Collection 
Firms for the samples were retrieved from 1 OK wizard.com. 1 OK wizard.com is 
an internet database composed of all SEC filings. It was established in 1999 to enable 
users to have direct access to the various items of a firm's filings without having to read 
through the entire annual report. The innovative technology of 1 OK wizard.com made it 
possible to access Item 7 A, "Quantitative and Qualitative Disclosures about Market 
Risks", from the outline of a firm's annual report (lOK) filed with the SEC. 
Item 7 A reports the method or methods, as mandated by the SEC, employed by a 
firm in disclosing the market risks associated with the use of derivatives. This section of 
the annual report discloses the dollar amounts, types of derivatives used by a firm, and 
whether the derivatives were used fortrading or for risk management. Item 7A is a 
subsection ofltem 7, "Management Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and 
Results of Operations" (MD & A), which discloses management's view of matters that 
have had and will have an impact on a firm's operations. Item 7 is an unaudited section 
of the annual report and an SEC required disclosure. 
The SEC requires registrants to file their annual reports within ninety days of their 
fiscal year-end. One of the criteria for selecting a firm for the sample is a December 31 
year-end which means that for a firm to be in compliance it should file by March 31. 
SEC filings from February 15 through April 15 of 1998, 1999, and 2000, were retrieved 
from 1 OK wizard.com to ensure that early and late filers were included in the samples. 
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The financial statements under examination were for the years, 1997, 1998, and 1999. 
The first year of 1997 was chosen because the SEC mandate for disclosing derivatives 
use went into effect June 15, 1997. 
The criteria for sample selection were: (1) December 31 year-end, (2) non-
regulated firms (utilities and financial firms were excluded), (3) firms using only one 
method of disclosing derivatives not a combination of methods and (4) there should be at 
least twenty-five days between earnings announcements and SEC filing date to filter out 
earnings announcements effects. Sample firms were selected from several industries and 
from the three major exchanges: New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock 
Exchange (AMEX), and the National Association of Securities Dealers and Quotation 
(NASDAQ). These inclusions would increase the generalization of the results. 
The tabular format firms were matched within ±10% of market capitalizations 
with sensitivity analysis or value at risk format firms as of December 31, 1997, 1998, and 
1999. Firms using a combination of two or all of these formats are eliminated. Firms are 
matched to control for size effects. Prior research indicates that firm size is associated 
with disclosure levels. Evidence has been provided to support the conclusion that large 
firms provide higher levels of disclosure, which in tum affect liquidity, information 
asymmetry, and cost of capital. Using matched firms spreads the size effects across the 
two groups of firms so that a major proportion of the variation in the dependent variable 
is explained by the independent variables in the model other than size. 
The SEC required firms with market capitalizations in excess of $2.5 billon to 
use one or a combination of the three methods in disclosing the use of financial 
derivatives for periods ending June 15, 1997, and firms with market capitalizations of 
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$2.5 billion or less should make the disclosure for fiscal periods ending June 15, 1998. 
Because of this requirement, small sample sizes are expected for 1997 matched firms. 
5.2 Test of Hypothesis 
There is a large body of research examining the bid-ask spreads that indicates that 
there is a positive relationship between the level of information asymmetry and the 
magnitude of the bid-ask spread. In this study it is expected that, since the tabular format 
provides disaggregated, detailed information (and thus reduces information asymmetry), 
the bid-ask spread will be smaller for companies using the tabular format than the bid-ask 
spread for companies using either the sensitivity analysis format or the value at risk 
format. 
Accounting research provides evidence that information asymmetry affects the 
size of bid-ask spreads. In several studies, the bid-ask spread is used to measure the 
effects of information asymmetry on various capital market factors ( e.g., liquidity and 
returns, Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; stock returns, stock prices, trading volume, risk, 
dealer competition, Demsetz, 1968; Tinic, 1972; Tinic and West, 1972; Stoll, 1978; 
Barnea and Logue, 1975; and Amihud and Mendelson, 1986, 1989). Studies have also 
used the bid-ask spreads to capture market reaction to certain disclosures in financial 
reporting (i.e., Coller and Yohn, 1997). 
The research design of this study is similar to that of Coller and Yohn ( 1997). Coller and 
Yohn (1997) investigate whether the market reacts to management efforts to reduce 
information asymmetry through the issuance of management earnings forecasts. They 
examine the proposition that management issues management earnings forecasts to 
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reduce information asymmetry. The results provide evidence to support the conclusion 
that firms with greater information asymmetry before the issuance of management 
earnings forecasts experienced smaller information asymmetry as measured by bid-ask 
spreads than non-issuing firms. 
In the spirit of Coller and Yohn (1997), the bid-ask spreads will be regressed on 
the format variable and the control variables. In this cross-sectional analysis, the 
regression coefficient of the format variable will capture the differences in the bid-ask 
spreads between the firms using the tabular format and firms using the sensitivity 
analysis format or the value at risk format. 
Also, similarly to Wilson (1987) the SEC filing date is used as the initial date 
when the annual report is available to the public. This is when derivatives disclosure 
methods are available to the public. There is at least twenty-five days between the SEC 
filing date and the earnings announcement dates for the sample firms. Bid-ask spreads 
are analyzed over three windows: four days prior to the SEC date (Pre-SEC), the Day of 
(SEC filing date), and four days after the SEC date (Post-SEC). The Pre-SEC samples 
consists of data. for the four days prior to the SEC filing date for each of the three years -
1997, 1998, and 1999. The Day of and the Post-SEC samples also consist of data for the 
day of the SEC filing and four days after the SEC filing respectively for each of the three 
years. 
It is expected that there would be no significant differences between the two 
groups of firms prior to the filing of the annual report with the SEC. The derivatives 
disclosure method is not known until after the issuance of the annual report and as such, 
there should be no significant differences between the two groups of firms. On the other 
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hand, the test for differences between the two groups of firms on the Day of SEC filing 
should show a significant difference in bid-ask spreads for the tabular firms. If the 
tabular format firms provide greater relative information content then the percentage 
change in bid-ask spreads should be larger for the tabular format firms. The null 
hypothesis assumes that there is no difference in the relative information content between 
both groups of firms after the issuance of derivatives disclosure information. A rejection 
of the null hypothesis could provide support for the hypothesis if the percentage change 
in bid-ask spreads for the tabular format firms are larger than the sensitivity analysis or 
value at risk format firms. We can conclude that the tabular format is more informative 
and reduces information asymmetry. If the results of the Day of SEC filing continue 
during the Post-SEC period we can conclude that the reaction is sustained during the five 
days after the SEC filing. 
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CHAPTER6 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
6.1 Sampling Results 
Table 1 illustrates the process used to select samples for this study. The total 
initial sample size for both groups of firms for 1997 was one hundred and thirty-five 
firms. Ninety-seven were eliminated because they could not be matched, leaving a total 
of 38 matched firms. Six utilities and financial firms were eliminated because these are 
specially regulated firms. Six firms were also removed because of incomplete data and 
having made filings with the SEC within twenty-five days of earnings announcements. 
The final samples consist of a total of 26 firms: thirteen firms for the tabular format firms 
and thirteen sensitivity analysis format or value at risk format firms. Smaller sample 
sizes were expected for the 1997 firms because it is the first year of implementation of 
the SEC's mandate for firms with market capitalizations in excess of $2.5 billion. 
Larger sample sizes are obtained for 1998 and 1999 since all firms are required to 
report the use of derivatives employing one or a combination of the three methods set 
forth by the SEC for fiscal periods ending or after June 15, 1998. The total initial number 
of firms for both groups for 1998 consisted of five hundred and seventeen firms. Three 
hundred and three firms were eliminated because they could not be matched, leaving two 
hundred and fourteen matched firms. Twenty-four utilities and financial firms were 
eliminated. Sixty-eight had incomplete data and filings were within twenty-five days of 
SEC filings and earnings announcements. The final total sample is comprised of one 
hundred and twenty-two firms: Sixty-one firms for each group. 
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The total initial 1999 sample consisted of five hundred and eighty-six firms. 
Three hundred and thirty-eight firms were unmatched. Twenty-six utilities and financial 
firms were eliminated along with seventy-two firms for incomplete data and filings 
within twenty-five days of SEC filing and earnings announcements. The final sample is 
comprised of one hundred and fifty firms: seventy-five firms for each group. 
Table 2 provides the distribution of sample firms for 1997, 1998, and 1999 by 
industry. The results show that no one industry dominates the samples. Table 3 shows 
the distribution of the samples by exchange listing. The New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) dominates with the most number of firms. For 1997, NYSE listing is twelve out 
thirteen firms or ninety-two percent; for 1998, it is 35 to 38 firms out of sixty-one, or 
fifty-seven to sixty-two percent; and for 1999, there are fifty-five firms out of seventy-
five, or seventy-three percent. The distribution of the sample firms on NASDAQ for 
1997, 1998, and 1999 for the tabular format firms were 1, 17, and 16, respectively. For 
the sensitivity analysis and value at risk format firms for the same period were 1, 23, and 
18, respectively. For the AMEX the distribution of the tabular format firms for 1997, 
1998, 1999 were 0, 6, and 4, respectively. The sensitivity analysis and value at risk 
format firms were 0, 3, and 2, for 1997, 1998, and 1999, respectively. 
6.2 Descriptive Statistics 
6.2.1 Market Capitalizations 
The descriptive statistics of the market capitalizations for each group of firms for 
the three years are shown in Table 4. Panel A provides the descriptive statistics for 1997 
for the tabular format and the sensitivity analysis format and value at risk format firms. 
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The means for market capitalizations for the sensitivity analysis and value at risk format 
firms of $11.5 billion are slightly higher than the tabular format firms of $10.5 billion, 
but the difference is not statistically significant. Because of the small sample, the 
Wilcoxon Rank Sum test was applied to determine ifthere is a significant difference 
between the means of the two groups of firms. 
SPSS statistics software package and Microsoft Excel were used to analyze the 
data. The means of market capitalization data of the samples for all three years were 
compared using the t-test and the Wilcoxon Rank Sum test to ensure that the sample 
firms were not significantly different in size. 
Small sample sizes do not approximate normal distribution and as such the t test 
for comparing means is not applicable because one of its criteria of normality is usually 
violated. A nonparametric test which does not depend on the assumption of normality 
should be used. One such nonparametric test is the Wilcoxon Rank Sum test or the 
Mann-Whitney U test, both give similar _results. The Wilcoxon Rank Sum test or the 
Mann-Whitney U test compares the means of two independent samples. The 
observations of the samples are combined and ranked. The ranks are then separated into 
the two original sample groups. The Z approximation formula is used for samples 
exceeding ten. The null hypothesis of equal means is rejected if the Z-test statistic 
exceeds+ 1.96 or is less than -1.96. 
Results reported in Table 4, Panel A show the Z-test statistic of -.231 exceeds the 
critical value of -1.96 with a p-value of .817. The decision is to accept the null 
hypothesis of equal means because the p-value is not significant and the Z-test statistic 
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exceeds -1.96. The conclusion is that there is no significant difference in the market 
capitalizations of the 1997 sample firms indicating that the matching was appropriate. 
The mean of$3.8 billion of the 1998 tabular format firms in Panel B exceeds the 
mean of $3.4 billion of the 1998 sensitivity analysis format and value at risk format 
firms. The results in Panel B also reveal that there is no significant difference between 
the market capitalizat!ons of the 1998 groups of firms. The t value is .165 with a p-value 
of .869 indicates that there is no significant difference between market capitalizations of 
the two groups of samples. These results also indicate that the matching of the firms is 
appropriate. The 1999 sample firms also reveal similar results as the 1997 and 1998 
groups of firms. There is no significant difference between the means of both groups of 
firms, as shown in Panel C ofTable 4. The t-value is .349 with a p-value of .727 also 
indicating that the matching was appropriate. The mean of tabular format firms of$3.6 
billion exceeds that ofthe sensitivity analysis format and value at risk format firms of 
$3.2 billion. 
The means of both groups of sample firms are larger in 1997 than the 1998 and 
1999 samples because 1997 is the first year of implementation ofFRR No. 48 and the 
Release requires that firms with market capitalizations in excess of $2.5 billion should 
comply for fiscal periods ending after June 15, 1997. Firms with market capitalizations 
of $2.5 billion dollars or less should comply for periods endings after June 15, 1998, 
hence only large firms were included in the 1997 samples. The 1998 and 1999 samples 
include both large and small firms, which makes means of both years smaller than 1997 
samples. 
45 
The data for the samples were retrieved from the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP), COMPUSTAT, the New York Stock Exchange Trade and Quote (NYSE 
T AQ), and the SEC Edgar databases. The December 31 year-end market capitalizations 
for a firm in each sample for the years 1997, 1998, and 1999 were obtained from CRSP. 
Stock returns, the bid and ask prices, and the daily number of transactions in a firm's 
stock were retrieved from the New York Stock Exchange Trade and Quote database 
(NYSE TAQ). Earnings announcement dates were taken from the December 31 
quarterly earnings reports from COMPUSTAT. The annual report filing dates were 
retrieved from the SEC Edgar database off the internet. 
6.2.2 Variables 
' The descriptive results provided in Table 6 suggest that the means of the bid-ask 
spreads for the tabular format firms are slightly larger than sensitivity analysis format and 
value at risk format firms but not statistically significant during the Pre-SEC and Post-
SEC periods as shown by Panels A and C of Table 5. Panel B reveals that the difference 
in the means is statistically significant only during the SEC filing date period. The means 
of the bid-ask spreads for the tabular format firms are larger than the sensitivity analysis 
and value at risk firms at the .05 level with a !-statistic of 2.450 during the SEC filing 
date. The difference of .35476 in the means of both groups of firms during the Day of 
SEC filing period is larger than the differences of .05004 and .03122 of both the Pre-SEC 
and Post-SEC periods respectively. The large difference in means documented on the 
Day of SEC filing period indicates that users reacted to the derivatives disclosure 
methods. 
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Panel A, B, and C of Table 5 reveal that the means ofDEP for the tabular format 
firms exceed the sensitivity analysis and value at risk firms. The differences in DEP is 
significant at the .005, .05, and .15, respectively. DEP is significantly larger for the 
tabular firms indicating that the tabular firms experienced greater liquidity than the 
sensitivity analysis or value at risk firms. Lee et al (1993) posits that depth is a measure 
of liquidity. This study states," .... market liquidity has both a price dimension (the 
spread) and a quantity dimension (the depth)". Lee et al (1993) propose that liquidity can 
easily be detected in depths rather than bid-ask spreads and they assert that depth is an 
important empirical proxy for market liquidity. The depth is the number of shares 
available at both purchases (the ask) and sales (the bid) prices. Leuz and Verrechia 
(2000) define liquidity as the willingness of some investors who hold firm shares to sell 
and the willingness of others to buy. TRANS for tabular firms is slightly larger than the 
sensitivity analysis and value at risk firms. Bartov and Bodnar (1996) and Leuz and 
Verrechia (2000) use annual share turnover as a proxy for information asymmetry and 
they both concluded that higher share turnover reflects smaller information asymmetry. 
Greater share turnover implies a greater number of transactions in firms' shares; hence, 
the tabular fc;,rmat firms with the greater number of transactions implies more liquidity 
and smaller information asymmetry. Panels A, B, and C of Table 5 also show that the 
means of PRICE is smaller for the tabular firms than for the sensitivity analysis and value 
at risk firms. The differences in PRICE for both groups of firms are statistically 
significant for the PRE-SEC and Post-SEC periods at the .01 level with t-statistics of -
2.806 and -2.655 respectively, but the difference between both groups of firms is not 
significant during the Day of the SEC filing period. On the other hand there are no 
47 
significant statistically differences in the means of VAR and TRANS for both groups of 
firms for all three periods, but the differences (.08341 and .04017) between the groups of 
firms for these variables during Day of the SEC filing period are larger than the Pre-SEC 
and Post-SEC periods. 
In summary, the results of Table 5 suggest that the tabular format firms provide 
greater relative inform.ation content and smaller information asymmetry as evidenced by 
the larger percentage change in bid-ask spreads and larger depths after the derivatives 
disclosure methods were revealed on the SEC filing date. No significant differences in 
the means of the bid-ask spreads were expected during the Pre-SECperiod because no 
derivatives disclosure methods would have been revealed. The results of Panel A provide 
support for this notion. There is no significant difference in the means of both groups of 
firms during the Post-SEC period, which suggests that the results of the Day of the SEC 
filing were not sustained during the Post-SEC period. 
6.3 Regression Analysis 
Prior research provides evidence to support the notion that when a firm's stock is 
actively traded (increase in the number of transactions, TRANS) there is an increase in 
the number of shares that are traded at the bid and ask prices (DEP). When dealers do 
not have to keep a firm's shares in inventory for a long period of time before they are 
traded, inventory costs are reduced and the difference in the bid and ask prices (spreads) 
become smaller, hence bid-ask spread is inversely related to DEP and the number of 
transactions in a firm's stock (Demsetz, 1968; Tinic, 1972; Stoll, 1978, Coller and Yohn, 
1997, and Leuz and Verrechia, 2000). A dealer will request relatively higher prices if 
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inventory of a firm's shares is kept for a long period of time, the wider the spread, the 
higher the price. Price is positively related to bid-ask spread (Demsetz, 1968; Tinic, 
1972; Tinic and West, 1972; Benston and Hagerman, 1974; and Coller and Yohn, 1997). 
It has been demonstrated that variability in stock returns affects the inventory carrying 
cost component of the bid-ask spread (Bamea and Logue, 1975; and Stoll, 1978). Higher 
variability increases the bid-ask spread, therefore, SPREAD will be positively related to 
VAR. 
Table 6, Panel A, reports the regression results of the five-day period prior to the 
SEC filing date, the Pre-SEC period. The coefficient on the FORMAT variable is close 
to zero (-.01166) indicating that there is not a significant difference in the bid-ask spreads 
of both groups of firms. The t-value of-.169 and ap-value of .866 for FORMAT support 
this conclusion. The indicator variable, FORMAT, captures the difference in bid-ask 
spread between both groups of firms. Since FORMAT takes on the value of zero for the 
sensitivity analysis format and value at risk format firms and the value of one for tabular 
format firms, the coefficient on FORMAT in excess of or below zero is attributed to the 
tabular format firms. DEP is significant at the .05 level with at-statistic of 2.416 
indicating greater depths for the tabular format firms. TRANS is also significant at the 
.001 level with at-statistic of -3.679 indicating that the tabular format firms had greater 
number of transactions than the sensitivity analysis format and value at risk format firms. 
The tabular format firms also experienced larger variances in stock returns as evidenced 
by the t-statistic of 8.365 for VAR with a p-value of .000. VAR is positively related to 
SPREAD which is consistent with prior research results. The statistic on TRANS is -
2.545 withp-value of .011 indicating a significant difference between both groups of 
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firms. TRANS is negatively related to SPREAD which is also consistent with the results 
of prior research. The results of Panel A support the notion that during Pre-SEC period, 
there is no significant difference in the percentage change in bid-ask spreads of both 
groups of firms. Before the issuance of information there should be no difference in the 
bid-ask spreads of the two groups of firms. The adjusted R2 is .071 which suggests that 
independent variables explain approximately seven percent of the variation in SPREAD. 
The results of Panel B, Table 6, show that the percentage change in bid-ask 
spreads for the tabular format firms are larger than the sensitivity analysis format and 
value at risk format firms. The coefficient on FORMAT is positive (.344) and significant 
at the .05 level with at-statistic of 2.375 indicating that the percentage change in bid-ask 
spreads are larger for the tabular format firms also indicating that there was a market 
reaction to the tabular format. This result suggests that the tabular format firms provided 
greater relative information content than the sensitivity analysis format or value at risk 
format firms. The reaction to the tabular format rejects the null hypothesis of no 
difference in the relative information content between the disclosures providing · 
disaggregated derivative data (the tabular format) and disclosures providing aggregated 
data (the sen~itivity analysis or value at risk format). DEP is not significant even though 
the coefficient is positive. PRICE is significant at the .005 level with a t-statistic of -
3 .181 suggesting that the difference in stock prices between the two groups of firms is 
significant. The negative t-statistic indicates that stock prices for the tabular format firms 
are smaller. VAR is also positively related to SPREAD, which is consistent with the 
results of prior research, and statistically significant at the .001 level. The coefficient on 
VAR is .316 with at-value of 3.711 which suggests that the variance in stock returns is 
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greater for the tabular format firms. The coefficient on TRANS is .09567, which is close 
to zero, with at-statistic of 1.444 (p-value = .150), indicating no significant difference in 
the number of stock transactions between the two groups of firms. The adjusted R2 for 
this period is .077 indicating that independent variables explain approximately eight 
percent of the variation in the dependent variable, SPREAD. 
The results of Panel B of Table 6 provide support for the hypothesis of a larger 
percentage change in bid-ask spreads for the tabular format firms after the release of the 
annual reports filed with the SEC. This paper sets forth the notion that after the 
disclosure of derivatives methods, the disaggregated derivatives disclosure method (i.e., 
tabular format) will result in a larger change in spreads than the aggregated derivatives 
disclosure methods (i.e., sensitivity analysis format and value at risk format). The results 
suggest that disaggregated disclosure (the tabular format) does provide greater relative 
information content than the aggregated disclosure (i.e., sensitivity analysis format or the 
value at risk format) as reflected by the bid-ask spreads of both groups of firms. The 
results indicate that the tabular format firms experienced smaller information asymmetry 
even though DEP is not significant, but PRICE is significant after the release of the 
annual reports which was anticipated. The results suggest that users reacted to the 
information provided by the derivatives disclosure methods revealed in the annual reports 
filed with the SEC. 
Panel C of Table 6 shows that there is no significant difference in the bid-ask 
spreads ofboth groups of firms. The coefficient of .01116 on FORMAT is close to zero 
with at-statistic of .156 and ap-value of .876, indicating no significant difference in the 
bid-ask spreads of both groups of firms. This result suggests that the reaction of the Day 
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of the SEC filing was not sustained during the Post-SEC period. DEP is significant at the 
.05 level with !-statistic of 2.031, indicating that the tabular format firms experienced 
greater depths than the sensitivity analysis format and value at risk format firms. PRICE 
is also significant at the .001 level with at-statistic of -4.509 indicating that tabular 
format firms experienced smaller stock prices. The coefficient on PRICE is negative (-
.242) which supports the conclusion of smaller stock prices for the tabular format firms. 
The coefficient on VAR is positive (.153) and significant at the .001 level with at-
statistic of 4.885. VAR is positively related to SPREAD which is consistent with results 
of prior research. The coefficient on TRANS is negative and close to zero (-.04562) 
indicating that there is no significant difference between the two groups of firms in the 
number of transactions in firms' stocks. The t-statistic of TRANS is -1.482 with ap-
value of .139. The result of the differences in bid-ask spreads of both groups experienced 
during the Day of SEC filing period was expected to be seen during the Post-SEC period. 
No significant difference in bid-ask spreads was seen during the Post-SEC period. 
The coefficient matrices shown in Table 7 for the three periods indicate that there 
is no problem of multicollinearity. Multicollinearity is the condition where some of the 
independent variables are highly correlated with each other. This condition exists if the 
correlation coefficient is . 70 or above. Multicollinearity makes it difficult to separate the 
individual effects of the independent variables on the dependent variable. The 
coefficients of correlated independent variables fluctuate widely making inferences 
invalid. During all three periods no correlation coefficient exceeded .55. The highest 
correlation is between PRICE and TRANS for all three periods which is expected 
because prior research suggests that there is a relationship between price and the number 
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of transactions in a firm's stock. Price and the number of transactions of a firm's stock 
are associated with liquidity. 
Before running the regression model the assumptions of the model are examined 
to determine if they have been met. The three major assumptions of a regression model 
are: (1) normality of the error terms, (2) homoscedasticity of error terms, and (3) 
independence of the error terms. The assumption of normality requires that the error 
terms are normally distributed for each value of the independent variable around the 
regression line. The homoscedasticity assumption requires constant variance of the error 
terms for all values of the independent variables. The independence of error terms 
requires that the error terms are not correlated at each value of the independent variables. 
A violation of any of these assumptions makes inferences about the regression invalid. 
The regression results revealed that these assumptions were not violated. 
In summary, the regression results provide support for the hypothesis. The 
disaggregated tabular format disclosing derivatives provide greater relative information 
content than the aggregated sensitivity analysis or the value at risk format. The results 
suggest that the disaggregated disclosures format reduce information asymmetry and 
provide greater relative information content than aggregated disclosure format as 
proposed by this study. The regression results demonstrate that DEP and TRANS are 
significant for the tabular format firms suggesting that these firms experienced greater 
liquidity than the sensitivity analysis format and value at risk format firms. The variables 
DEP and TRANS could also be capturing the difference in information asymmetry 
between both groups of firms. These variables, or variations thereof, have been used as 
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proxies for information asymmetry in accounting research (Lee et al., 1993; Bartov and 
Bodnar, 1996; and Leuz and Verrechia, 2000). 
In summary, the results support the conclusion that disaggregated derivatives 
disclosure method, the tabular format, provides greater relative information content than 
the aggregated derivatives disclosure methods, namely the sensitivity analysis and the 
value at risk formats. The results also indicate that tabular format reduces information 
asymmetry because these firms are more liquid than the aggregated format firms. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS 
Prior accounting research suggests that disaggregated accounting information has 
greater relative information content than aggregated accounting information. Accounting 
research also suggests that disclosure levels are associated with information asymmetry, 
particularly disaggregated information reduces information asymmetry. Thus, the 
purpose of this paper is to provide evidence to support the proposition that of the three 
methods mandated by the SEC in disclosing derivatives, the disaggregated method (the 
tabular format) has greater relative information content than the aggregated disclosure 
methods (i.e., the sensitivity analysis format or value at risk format). This paper sought 
to provide evidence to support the proposition that the tabular format reduces information 
asymmetry in comparison to the sensitivity analysis format or the value at risk format. 
Regression analyses were conducted for three periods: five days prior to filing of 
annual reports with the SEC (Pre-SEC), the day of the SEC filing (Day of), and five days 
subsequent to the SEC filing (Post-SEC). It was expected that during the Pre-SEC period 
there would be no significant difference in the bid-ask spreads of both groups because the 
methods of disclosing derivatives would be unknown. As expected during this period no 
significant difference was documented in the bid-ask spreads of the tabular format firms 
and the sensitivity analysis format and value at risk format firms since no information 
regarding derivatives was disclosed. During the Day of the SEC filing period, the tabular 
format firms exhibit larger percentage change in bid-ask spreads which provide support 
for the hypothesis of greater relative information content for the disaggreg~ted disclosure 
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method. The results from the regression analysis indicate that information is provided by 
the derivatives disclosure methods. The brevity of the sensitivity analysis and value at 
risk formats could have been seen as not providing all the information necessary to 
understand derivatives. No significant difference was documented in the bid-ask spreads 
of both groups during the Post-SEC period which means that information effect observed 
during the Day of the SEC filing was not sustained during the five days after filing of the 
annual report. 
The SEC, in Financial Reporting Release No. 48, assumes that the tabular format 
would provide greater relative information content since the method provides detailed 
disaggregated information. It appears that the results of this study support the SEC's 
assumption which means that the summary disclosure methods (i.e., the sensitivity 
analysis ·and value at risk formats) did not meet all of users' information needs on 
derivatives. Also, the results seem to indicate that the tabular format could be providing 
necessary information which users consider relevant in making economic decisions 
regarding derivatives. The SEC should note that the public is responding s information in 
the derivatives disclosure methods. Users do utilize the information provided by the 
derivatives disclosures. 
The findings of this study are important because practitioners can choose the 
derivatives disclosure method that will reduce information asymmetry and thereby reduce 
some of the adverse economic consequences of high cost of capital, illiquidity, and 
market inefficiency. The findings also provide justification for regulatory bodies for 
issuing regulations that provide either aggregated or disaggregated disclosures since it 
was assumed that tabular format ( disaggregated disclosure) had greater relative 
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information content than the sensitivity analysis format or value at risk format 
( aggregated disclosure). One of the complaints lodged by interest groups was the lack of 
understanding of the public on derivatives. The findings will help the SEC in 
determining which derivatives disclosure method improves the public's understanding of 
derivatives. It seems as if the disaggregated methods do provide greater relative 
information than the aggregated disclosure methods. 
The SEC, F ASB and other regulatory organizations are concerned about ensuring 
that the public has all the information necessary to make informed economic decisions. 
Information asymmetry creates inequity in the capital markets because certain individuals 
have more information than others and consequently unwanted conditions like illiquidity 
and market inefficiency can occur. An extension of this study would be investigating 
whether firms are fully complying with FRR No. 48. Roulstone (1999) finds that most 
firms using either one or a combination of the disclosure methods were not fully 
complying with the SEC's mandate. Roultone (1999) examines 1997 (early) filers, but 
an investigation of filings after 1997 could tell a different story. Another area for 
investigation could be in terms of analysts' ratings of the alternative methods provided in 
Financial Reporting Release No. 48. Which ones do analysts consider to be more 
informative? It would be interesting to examine the reason why firms would choose to 
change from one format to the other. 
The results of this study are not generalizable to firms using a combination of the 
three disclosure formats required by FRR No. 48. The SEC allows firms to use either one 
or a combination of disclosure formats in reporting derivatives of different market risk 
categories (interest rate risk, foreign currency exchange rate risk, commodity price risk, 
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and any other significant market risk). Only firms with year-end of December 31 were 
included in the samples. Compliance with FRR No. 48 by firms is improving the 
public's knowledge of derivatives and market risk. 
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APPENDIX A 
TABLE 1 
Sample Selection Procedure0 
1997 1998 1999 
Total Initial Firmsb 135 517 586 
Unmatched Firmsc {21} (303) (338) 
atched Firms 38 214 248 
Utilities and Financial Firmsd ( 6) ( 24) ( 26) 
Incomplete data and filings within 
Twenty-five days Lfil (@ (72) 
Total Final Firmse 26 122 150 
Final Sets of Firmsf 13 61 75 
a Sample firms were retrieved from lOKwizard.com, an internet database that provides 
the entire SEC filings. Firms were selected only if one derivatives disclosure method 
were used ( either the tabular, or the sensitivity analysis, or the value at risk format) not 
a combination of methods, and December 31 year-end. 
b Includes all firms that satisfy the requirements in a. 
c These are sensitivity analysis or value at risk that could not be matched with tabular 
format firms. 
d Utilities and financial firms were deleted because these are regulated firms. Also 
included are railroad firms. 
e These are the total firms for both groups. 
f Total firms in e separated into both groups: 13 tabular firms and 13 sensitivity analysis 
or value at risk firms for 1997; 61 firms per group for 1998; and 75 firms for 1999. 
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TABLE2 
Sample Distribution by lndustry8 
Panel A 
Industry SIC 1997 -Tabular* 1997 - SA/VAR** 
Drilling Oil/Gas 1381 2 
Wood House Furniture 2511 1 
Industrial Inorganic Products 2810 1 
Pharmaceutical 2834 2 
Miscellaneous Chemical Products 2890 1 
Petroleum Refining 2911 1 3 
Metal Cans 3411 1 
Bolts, Nuts, Screws 3452 1 
Engines/Turbines 3511 1 
Farm Machinery 3523 1 
Computers 3573 1 
Vehicle Parts & Accessories 3714 1 
Aircraft Engines 3724 1 
Orthopedic Prosthetics 3842 1 
Photographic Equipment 3861 1 
Radiotelephone Communications 4810 2 
Telephone Communications 4813 1 
Refuse Systems 4953 1 
Wholesale-metals 5052 1 
Services-Advertising 7311 1 
--------
---------
Total 13 13 
--------
---------
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TABLE 2 (continued) 
Sample Distribution by lndustrya 
Panel B 
Industry SIC 1998 - Tabular* 
Crude Petroleum 1311 2 
Drilling Oil/ gas 1381 2 
Paper Mills 2621 2 
Converted Paper 2670 
Plastic materials 2821 2 
Special Industrial Machinery 3550 2 
Electronic Components 3670 2 
Trucking/Trucking Courier 4210/4213 2 
Radiotelephone Communications 4812 2 
Telephone Communications 4813 3 
Radio Stations 4832 
Retail Auto Dealers 5500 2 
Computer Services 7370 
Auto Rental 7510 2 
Othersb Various 38 
Total 61 
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1998-SA/VAR** 
4 
2 
3 
1 
2 
3 
46 
61 
--------------------
TABLE 2 (continued) 
Sample Distribution by lndustry8 
Panel C 
Industry SIC 1999-Tabular* 
Crude Petroleum 1311 5 
Drilling Oil/Gas 1381 2 
Malt Beverages 2082 
Cigarettes 2111 
Paper Mills 2621 3 
Inqustrial Inorganic Chemicals 2810 2 
Plastic Materials 2821 
Pharmaceutical 2834 
Biological Products 2836 2 
Petroleum Refining 2911 2 
Tires/Inner Tubes 3011 
Plastic Products 3089 
Footwear (no rubber) 3140 
Rolling Drawing 3350 
Farm Machinery 3523 
Radio/TV Broadcast 3663 2 
Vehicle Parts 3714 
Photographic Equipment 3861 
Radiotelephone Communications 4812 2 
Telephone Communications 4813 2 
Retail- Grocery Store 5411 2 
Retail - Auto Dealers 5500 2 
Hotels/Motels 7011 2 
Services - Misc. Equip Rental 7350 
Othersb Various 47 
Total 75 
1999 - SNV AR** 
5 
1 
2 
2 
2 
3 
2 
2 
3 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
43 
75 
a The Standard Industrial Classification Codes (SIC) were retrieved from the SEC 
website database, EDGAR. 
b Firms in this category had only one firm in other types of business. 
* This is the tabular format firms and** SNV AR represent the sensitivity analysis and 
value at risk format firms. 
67 
TABLE3 
Sample Distribution by Exchange Listing3 
1997 1998 
Tab* SAN AR** Tab* SAN AR** 
NYSEa 12 12 38 35 
NASDAQb 1 1 17 23 
AMEXC 6 3 
Total 13 13 61 61 
a, ,c Exchange data were retrieved from CRSP database. 
* Tabular format firms 
** Sensitivity analysis format firmsN alue at risk firms 
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1999 
Tab* SAN AR** 
55 55 
16 18 
4 2 
75 75 
TABLE4 
Descriptive Statistics of Firms' Market Capitalizations3 
Panel A 
Meanb 
Standard Deviation 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Count 
PanelB 
Meanc 
Standard Deviation 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Count 
Panel C 
Meand 
Standard Deviation 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Count 
1997 -Tabular (OOO's) 1997 - SA/VAR (OOO's) Z-Stat 
$ 10567740 $ 11546803 -.231 
14215748 14662173 
2516435 2510097 
55839982 56624813 
13 13 
1998 -Tabular (OOO's) 1998- SA/VAR (OOO's) T-Stat 
$ 3776765 $ 3390136 .165 
13088504 12760992 
7598 7256 
97535450 97735838 
61 61 
p-value 
.817 
p-value 
.869 
1999 -Tabular (OOO's) =19~9~9_-~S=A~/ ~V=AR~(~O~OO~'"""s)~T~-=St=a~t __ p_-~v=al=ue 
$ 3642779 $ 3160073 .349 .727 
8901005 8001104 
22767 22614 
61146508 62252053 
75 75 
a Data for market capitalizations were retrieved from the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP). 
b The Wilcoxon Rank Sum test results indicate no significant difference between 1997 
tabular format and the sensitivity analysis or value at risk format firms: 
Z statistic = -.231 > -1.96 supports the null hypothesis of equal means (p-value = .840). 
c The t-test for the 1998 groups of firms indicate no significant difference: t = .165 with 
p-value = .869. 
d t-test shows no significant difference in means of the two groups of firms: t = .349 with 
p-value = .727. 
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TABLES 
Sample Means of Variables a 
Panel A - Four Days Prior to SEC Filing (Pre SECt 
T St. Deviation 
Tabular SANAR Differencee Statistic p-value Tab SANAR 
SPREAD -2.33367 -2.38371 .05004 .718 .473 1.184 1.219 
DEP 3.05904 2.89265 .16639 3.458 .001 1.052 .786 
PRICE 2.91712 3.05319 .13607 -2.806 .005 1.057 .796 
VAR -5.30704 -5.34105 .03401 .586 .558 1.185 1.018 
TRANS 4.89187 4.89100 .00087 .010 .992 1.730 1.576 
Panel B - Day of SEC Filingc 
T St. Deviation 
Tabular SANAR Difference• Statistic p-value Tab SANAR 
SPREAD -2.12890 -2.48366 .35476 2.450 .015 1.238 1.253 
DEP 3.06581 2.83784 .22797 2\.057 .041 1.094 .796 
PRICE 2.92579 3.05481 .12839 -1.185 .237 1.052 .801 
VAR -5.31128 -5.22787 .08341 -.666 .506 1.093 1.037 
TRANS 4.91141 4.87124 .04017 .205 .838 1.699 1.679 
Panel C - Four Days After SEC Filing (Post SECt 
T St. Deviation 
Tabular SANAR Differencee Statistic p-value Tab SANAR 
SPREAD -2.40231 -2.43353 .03122 .436 .633 1.235 1.226 
DEP 2.97564 2.89843 .00866 1.619 .106 1.027 .799 
PRICE 2.91867 3.05355 .13488 -2.655 .008 1.066 .887 
VAR -5.11688 -5.19175 .07487 1.086 .277 1.360 1.259 
TRANS 4.88619 4.88140 .00479 .054 .957 1.775 1.627 
a Log of sample data for each of the three periods: 4 days prior to SEC filing (Pre-SEC); Day of 
SEC filing; and 4 days after SEC filing (Post-SEC) with 13 firms, 61 firms, and 75 firms 
respectively for 1997, 1998, and 1999. 
b 4 Days prior to SEC filing date consists of a total of 596 observations for each group: 1997 
(52); 1998 (244); and 1999 (300). 
c Day of SEC filing consists of 149 observations for each group of firms: 1997 (13); 1998 (61); 
and 1999 (75). 1999. 
d 4 Days after SEC filing date consists of 596 observations as Pre-SEC period. 
e Absolute difference in means of variables of the two groups of sample firms. 
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TABLE6 
Coefficient Estimates of Tabular Format Firms and Matched 
Sensitivity Analysis and Value at Risk Format Firms a 
Panel A - Four Days Pior to SEC Filingb 
f3o f31 f32 {33 {34 
Coeff -.115 .122 -.193 .311 -.07813 
t-stat -.430 2.416 -3.679 8.365 -2.545 
p-value .667 .016** .000**** .000**** .011 ** 
R2 = .075 Adjusted R2 = .071 F = 18.733 
Panel B - Day of SEC Filingc 
f3o f31 f32 {33 {34 
Coeff -.421 .07544 -.360 .316 .09567 
t-stat -.735 .709 -3.181 3.711 1.444 
p-value .463 .479 .002*** .000**** .150 
{35 
.01166 
-.169 
.866 
Sig.= .000 
{35 
.344 
2.375 
.018** 
R2 = .093 Adjusted R2 = .077 F = 5.784 Sig.= .000 
Panel C - Four Days After SEC Filingd 
f3o f31 f32 {33 {34 {35 
Coeff -.984 .101 -.242 .153 -.04562 .01116 
t-stat -3.878 2.031 -4.509 4.885 -1.482 .156 
p-value .000**** .042** .000**** .000**** .139 .876 
R2 = .052 Adjusted R2 = .048 F = 12.563 Sig.= .000 
a This table provides the regression results for differences in bid-ask spreads of tabular format firms and 
sensitivity analysis and value at risk format firms using the natural logarithm of all variables except 
FORMAT. 
SPREAD is the relative bid-ask spread for each day. The relative bid-ask spread for each day of the Pre-
SEC period is the difference between the bid-ask spreads of day two and day one divided by the average of 
the Pre-SEC period bid-ask spreads day two spread is the difference between day two and day three 
divided by the average of Pre-SEC days' bid-ask spreads). The Day of SEC period is computed as the 
difference of day five and day six divided by the bid-ask spread of the day five. The relative bid-ask spread 
for day six of the Post-SEC period is the difference between day six and seven divided by the average of 
the bid-ask spreads of the Post-SEC period. 
PRICE is the average of all transaction prices during each day 
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TRANS is the number of transactions per day 
VAR is the daily variance ofreturns 
DEP is the average number of shares in all quotes during the day 
*, **,***and****, Significant at.IO, .05, .005 and .001 levels respectively. 
The FORMAT variable takes the value of one for tabular format firms and O otherwise. 
b 4 Days prior to SEC filing date consists of a total of 596 observations for each group: 1997 
(52); 1998 (244); and 1999 (300). 
c Day of SEC filing consists of 149 observations for each group of firms: 1997 (13); 1998 (61); 
and 1999 (75). 1999. 
d 4 Days after SEC filing date consists of 596 observations as Pre;.SEC period. 
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TABLE7 
Correlation Coefficients for Regression Analysis3 
Panel A - Four Days Prior to SEC Filing 
SPREAD DEP 
SPREAD 1.0000 -.025 
(.195) 
DEP 1.0000 
PRICE 
VAR 
TRANS 
FORMAT 
Panel B - Day of SEC Filing 
SPREAD DEP 
SPREAD 
DEP 
PRICE 
VAR 
TRANS 
FORMAT 
1.000 .039 
(.252) 
1.000 
PRICE 
-.115 
(.000)*** 
-.312 
(.000)*** 
1.000 
PRICE 
-.118 
(.023)** 
-.310 
(.000)*** 
1.000 
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VAR TRANS 
.169 -.116 
(.000)*** (.000)*** 
-.488 .215 
(.000)*** (.000)*** 
.402 .549 
(.000)*** (.000)*** 
1.000 .160 
(.000)*** 
1.000 
VAR TRANS 
.138 .023 
(.010)** (.351) 
-.537 .247 
(.000)*** (.000)*** 
.409 .538 
(.000)*** (.000)*** 
1.000 .121 
(.020)** 
1.000 
FORMAT 
.023 
(.216) 
.097 
(.000)*** 
-.080 
(.003)** 
.023 
(.221) 
-.006 
(.424) 
1.000 
FORMAT 
.157 
(.004)** 
.125 
(.017)* 
-.093 
(.059)* 
-.039 
(.253) 
.002 
(.488) 
1.000 
TABLE 7 ( continued) 
Panel C - Four Days After SEC Filing 
SPREAD DEP PRICE VAR TRANS FORMAT 
SPREAD 1.000 .050 -.177 .052 -.119 .023 
(.045)** (.000)*** (.038)** (.000)*** (.223) 
DEP 1.000 -.317 -.436 .219 .035 
(.000)*** (.000)*** (.000)*** (.117) 
PRICE 1.000 .385 .537 -.075 
(.000)*** (.000)*** (.005)* 
VAR 1.000 .137 .015 
(.000)*** (.303) 
TRANS 1.000 .019 
(.257) 
FORMAT 1.000 
This table is the correlation matrices for regression coefficients of the tabular format firms and 
the sensitivity analysis and value at risk format firms, using the natural logarithm of variables 
except FORMAT. SPREAD is the average of all bid-ask spreads quoted during each day. PRICE 
is the average of all transaction prices during each day. TRANS is the number of transactions per 
day. VAR is the daily variance ofreturns. DEP is the average number of shares in all quotes 
during the day.*,**,***, Significant at .05, .005 and .001 levels respectively. FORMAT, the 
indicator variable, takes the value of one for tabular format firms and O otherwise. 
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